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Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Against Foreign States or State
Agencies

Dr. S.1. Strong*

Britain's Lord Denning once said that "as a moth is drawn to the light,
so is a litigant drawn to the United States."1 Certainly, as a pro-arbitration
state and a signatory to various international conventions concerning the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,2 the United States seems a natural
place to bring an action to enforce an arbitral award against a foreign state
or state agency. However, suing a sovereign has not traditionally been a
simple task in the United States or elsewhere. Most nations grant foreign
states the presumption of immunity, thus denying that their domestic courts
have jurisdiction to hear a dispute involving a foreign sovereign unless an
exception to immunity exists.3
For years, U.S. courts took a highly deferential, "hands-off' approach
to litigation involving a foreign sovereign. However, recent case law out of
the D.C. Circuit has radically diminished the jurisdictional elements that
plaintiffs must establish before a U.S. court will assert its power to enforce
an arbitral award against a foreign state or state agency. This Article
* Counsel, Baker & McKenzie LLP, Chicago, Illinois. Attorney, Supreme Court of the
United States, Illinois and New York State and Federal Courts; Solicitor, Supreme Court of
England and Wales. D.Phil., University of Oxford; Ph.D., University of Cambridge; J.D.,
Duke University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California,
Davis. The author wishes to thank Mark N. Bravin of Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP for his
assistance. All errors of course remain the author's own.
1 Smith Klein & French Labs., Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (C.A.).
2 See, e.g.. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, opened
for signature Jan. 3, 1975, 104 Stat. 44, O.A.S.T.S. No. 12 [hereinafter Inter-American
Convention]; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.
38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
3 Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976) with State Immunity Act 1978 (U.K.).
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investigates this recent shift and describes what contacts, if any, a foreign
state or state agency must have with the United States before a U.S. court
will assert jurisdiction under sections 1605(a)(1) and 1605(a)(6) of the U.S.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). 4 This Article will also
discuss the likelihood and propriety of other circuits following the D.C.
Circuit's lead.
THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER
U.S. LAW
Most parties coming to the United States to enforce foreign arbitral
awards proceed under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").5 The FAA
gives U.S. federal courts the power to enforce agreements to arbitrate by
compelling arbitration, staying litigation in the federal courts, and
confirming and enforcing arbitral awards. Chapter 2 of the FAA gives
domestic effect to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"), 6 thus
making enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the Convention a
matter of federal rather than state, law. According to section 203 of the
FAA, U.S. federal district courts have original jurisdiction over actions to
enforce foreign arbitral awards. 7 Chapter 3 of the FAA gives domestic
effect to the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, 8 with original jurisdiction being given to the federal district
courts under section 302. Actions under the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
("ICSID") 9 fall outside of the FAA, although federal district courts also
have exclusive jurisdiction over actions to enforce ICSID awards. ' 0
However, parties seeking to enforce arbitral awards against foreign
states or state agencies do not establish subject-matter jurisdiction under the
FAA. Instead, they must proceed under the FSIA. 1' Passed in 1976, the
FSIA codifies the rules relating to sovereign immunity and provides "the
12
sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state" in U.S. courts.
The term "foreign state" includes political subdivisions of a foreign state as
I.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
1 9 U.S.C. § 1.
6 New York Convention, supra note 2.
4

7 See S.I. Strong, Invisible Barriersto the Enforcement of ForeignArbitral Awards in the

United States, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 479 (2004), for a discussion of recent developments
concerning personal jurisdiction under the FAA.
8 Inter-American Convention, supra note 2.
9 ICSID Convention, supra note 2.
'0 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(b).
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611.
12Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428,434 (1989).
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well as their agencies and instrumentalities. 13
Agencies and
instrumentalities "are accorded a presumption of independent status. ' 4
Federal district courts have original (but not exclusive) jurisdiction over any
dispute against a foreign state 5 and the FSIA will, in appropriate
circumstances, be applied retroactively to claims arising prior to its
enactment.16
The FSIA grants foreign states immunity from legal action in the
United States unless one of the several exceptions described in sections
1605 to 1607 of the Act applies. 17 Under the original text of the Act, a state
became subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if it waived its claim to
immunity, either explicitly or implicitly, 18 engaged in commercial activity, 9
expropriated property in violation of international law,2 ° gained rights to
property situated in the United States, 21 or engaged in certain types of
tortious activity giving rise to personal injury or death in the United
States.22 States also lost immunity if they became involved in an admiralty
suit to enforce a maritime lien.23
In 1988, Congress added a new exception addressing actions to
enforce or confirm arbitral awards to which a foreign state is a party.2 4
Prior to 1988, parties could overcome a state's claim to sovereign immunity
in actions to enforce arbitral awards by establishing the existence of an
implied waiver under section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA. Discrepancies in the
application of the implied waiver exception arose among the various federal
circuits, however, leading Congress to create a new exception. 25
Nevertheless, U.S. courts continue to rely on implied waivers in
enforcement proceedings, using them to establish jurisdiction in instances
where the arbitration exception does not apply.
In 1996, Congress amended the FSIA again, this time creating an
exception to address states that engage in certain acts of state-sponsored
13 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2000). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (further defining a state
"agency or instrumentality").
14 Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 446 (D.C. Cir.

1990).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000).
16 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
1728 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607; Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993); Argentine
Republic, 488 U.S. at 435.
"828 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2000).
19 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
20 Id. § 1605(a)(3).
2" Id. § 1605(a)(4).
22 Id. § 1605(a)(5).
23

Id. § 1605(b).

24

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6).
See infra Section II.A. 1.

25
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terrorism causing harm to U.S. citizens. 26 Courts and commentators agree
that this amendment constitutes a radical departure from previous
conceptions about sovereign immunity under both U.S. and international
law.27
Because Congress is constitutionally empowered to determine which
controversies may be heard by Article III courts, 288 the FSIA's ability to
establish subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal courts has never been
denied.
However, the analysis does not stop once subject-matter
jurisdiction has been established. Under U.S. law, federal courts must also
establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant,29 and it is here that
problems arise under the FSIA.
II.

DUE PROCESS CONCERNS UNDER THE FSIA

Courts may obtain personal
defendant's property in one of two
through general jurisdiction.
In
jurisdiction in an action to enforce a
party, the Ninth Circuit stated that:

jurisdiction over a defendant or a
ways: through specific jurisdiction or
a recent case considering personal
foreign arbitral award against a private

A court exercises specific jurisdiction where the cause of action arises
out of or has a substantial connection to the defendant's contacts with
the forum. Alternatively, a defendant whose contacts are substantial,
continuous, and systematic is subject to a court's general jurisdiction
even if the suit concerns matters not arising out of his contacts with the
forum. Whether dealing with specific or general jurisdiction, the
touchstone remains "purposeful availment." By requiring that "contacts
proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a
'substantial connection' with the forum State," the Constitution ensures
that "a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts. 3 °
As this statement indicates, the need to establish personal jurisdiction is a
constitutional mandate rather than a statutory one.
26
27

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 90 (D.C.

Cir. 2002); Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a "Person"? Does it Matter?: Personal
Jurisdiction, Due Process,and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
&POL. 115, 156 (2001).
28U.S. CONST. art. III.
29 See generally GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION
IN
U.S. COURTS: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 31-33 (1992) (describing the evolution of
personal jurisdiction requirements from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) to Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and beyond).
30 Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123
(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

Enforcement ofArbitralAwards Against Foreign States or State Agencies
26:335 (2006)

In the years since the FSIA was enacted, courts have struggled to
identify whether and to what extent the constitutional aspects of personal
jurisdiction apply to foreign states. The debate has its roots in Title 28 of
the United States Code, section 1330(b), which states that "[p]ersonal
jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over
which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where
service has been made under section 1608 of this title. 31 Section 1330(a)
of Title 28 states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign
state.., as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under... this title or
under any applicable international agreement.32
When read together, these provisions suggest that "the [FSIA] makes the
statutory aspect of personal jurisdiction simple: sub ject-matter jurisdiction
plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction. ,
As is often the case, the apparent clarity of the statutory language has
given rise to extreme confusion, with courts struggling to coordinate the
language of section 1330 with common law constitutional principles
concerning personal jurisdiction. For example, some courts have relied on
section 1330(b) to hold explicitly that a party may not assert a lack of
personal jurisdiction if one of the exceptions to immunity exists and service
of process is proper.34 In courts that adopt this approach, there is no need to
demonstrate the same sort of "minimum contacts" that are normally
required to establish personal jurisdiction as a matter of constitutional law. 5
Advocates of this position rely on several different rationales. Some claim
that the constitutional protections of due process were built into the statute
by Congress, 36 thus implying that any judicial oversight is either
unnecessary or unwarranted. This position is based on the FSIA's
legislative history, which states:

3128 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
32

1d. § 1330(a).

33 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
34 See, e.g., Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 994 F. Supp. 1299, 1312 (D. Colo.
1998); M.B.L. Int'l Contractors v. Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F. Supp. 52, 56 (D.D.C. 1989);
Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm'n, 604 F. Supp. 703, 710 (D.D.C. 1985), affid on other
grounds, 808 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
35 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (describing the
constitutional "minimum contacts" analysis); see also supra notes 29-30 and accompanying
text.
36 See, e.g., M.B.L. Int'l Contractors,725 F. Supp. at 55.
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Section 1330(b) provides in effect, a Federal long-arm statute over
foreign states .... The requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts
and adequate notice are embodied in the provision .... Significantly,
each of the immunity provisions, sections 1605 [including original
subsections (a)(1) through (5)] - 1607, requires some connection
between the lawsuit and the United States or an express or implied
waiver by the foreign state of its immunity from jurisdiction. These
immunity provisions, therefore, prescribe the necessary contacts which
must exist before our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction. Besides
incorporating these jurisdictional contacts by reference, section 1330(b)
also satisfies the due process requirement of adequate notice by
prescribing that proper service be made under section 1608 of the bill.37
Thus, "this bill would for the first time in U.S. law, provide a statutory
procedure for making' 38service upon, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction
over, a foreign state.
The trouble with this approach is that it reverses the normal order of
precedence in American constitutional law. Unlike jurisdictions where the
legislature reigns supreme, in the United States the judiciary has the power
and the obligation to review the constitutionality of all legislation.
Congress does not decide whether it has adequately complied with
constitutional principles; the courts do so.
Giving literal effect to the quoted portion of the FSIA's legislative
history would also give short shrift to other aspects of the legislative
history, including the statement that "[a] principle purpose" of the FSIA "is
to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive
branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy
implications of immunity determinations assuring litigants that these often
crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process. '39 Requiring the courts to adhere slavishly to the
statutory elements of personal jurisdiction would limit the judiciary's
oversight capacity, as envisioned by the FSIA itself. However, parsing out
phrases from the legislative history has proved problematic, particularly
since at least one court has termed that history inconclusive,40 while another
has termed it insufficiently authoritative.41 Instead, it is more appropriate to
" H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6612, as quoted
in Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 482 F. Supp. 1175,

1177 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated without opinion, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
" H.R. Rep. 94-1487 at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606, as quoted in S &
Davis Int'l Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1301 (11 th Cir. 2000).
39 FLOWERS, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES,

H.R. No. 91-1487 at 7 (1976), as cited in Halverson, supra note 27, at 119 n. 21.
40 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
41Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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interpret the statute in accordance with longstanding principles of
constitutional law.
U.S. courts recently reviewed the rights of private individuals in

actions to enforce arbitral awards and explicitly considered the question of
personal jurisdiction under the FAA. 42 As these cases make clear, subjectmatter jurisdiction arises out of the provisions of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution which divide power among the branches of government.

Personal jurisdiction arises out of a completely separate area, namely the
liberty-oriented Due Process Clause. The two issues cannot be collapsed
into a single analysis, even if Congress wished to do so.
The Second Circuit recognized as much in Texas Trading & Milling
Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria,4 3 an early FSIA case. Here, the court
downplayed the legislative history and stated that "the [FSIA] cannot create
'44
personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it."
Numerous U.S.
courts have followed Texas Trading and undertaken separate constitutional

analyses after evaluating the statutory elements of personal jurisdiction
under the FSIA.4 5 Although courts in several other circuits, including the
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits as well as the D.C. District Court, followed
Texas Trading, others have begun to question it on the grounds that foreign

states may not be "persons" within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution
and therefore may not be entitled to the same "minimum contacts" analysis

that private parties are entitled to claim.46 This rationale arises as a result of
the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Argentina v. Weltover, which

assumed, without deciding, that a foreign state was a "person" under the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 47

However, the Supreme

Court phrased its opinion in such a way as to signal a disinclination to
extend due process protections to foreign states, should the question ever
arise in the future. In so doing, the Supreme Court relied heavily on a
42 See Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2002); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminum

Factory," 283 F.3d 208, 212 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 101 (2002);
Transatlantic Bulk Shipping v. Saudi Chartering, 622 F. Supp 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Strong, supra note 7 passim.
43Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d
Cir.
1981) (involving the commercial activity exception under the FSIA), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1148 (1982).
44 Id. at 308.
45 See, e.g., S & Davis Int'l Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1303-04 (11th
Cir. 2000); T.H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of Marshall Islands, 174 F.2d 969, 974 (9th Cir.
1998); Foremost-McKesson Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 759 F. Supp. 855, 860-61
(D.D.C. 1991); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 482 F.
Supp. 1175, 1177 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated without opinion, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
46 See, e.g., S & Davis Int'l Inc., 218 F.3d at 1303; Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of the State of
Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
47 Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
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previous decision holding that individual U.S. states are not "persons"
under the Due Process Clause.4 8
In 1981, when the Second Circuit held in Texas Trading that a foreign
state was a "person" within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, it engaged
in only a cursory analysis of the subject. 49 Because Texas Trading is not
binding outside of the Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit was able to
undertake its own analysis of the constitutional status of foreign states in
5°
the 2002 case of Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
There, the D.C. Circuit concluded that foreign states are not "persons" as a
matter of U.S. constitutional law and are therefore exempt from due process
protections of personal jurisdiction. 51 According to Price, courts faced with
actions under the FSIA need not-and indeed should not-consider the
amount and type of contacts between a foreign state and the United States,
but instead need only adopt the statuto "subject-matter jurisdiction plus
service of process" test described above. 5
It was unclear whether Price, which arose under section 1605(a)(7)
(the terrorism exception) would apply to enforcement actions under sections
1605(a)(1) (implied waiver) or 1605(a)(6) (arbitration) of the FSIA.
Recently, however, the D.C. Circuit demonstrated its willingness to extend
the principles of Price to actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards in TMR
Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine. Whether this approach
will be adopted outside the D.C. Circuit and whether it will (or should) be
upheld within the Circuit remains to be seen.
III. JURISDICTION IN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Parties wishing to enforce a foreign arbitral award against a foreign
state or state party tend to proceed under either section 1605(a)(6), the
arbitration exception, or section 1605(a)(1), the implied waiver exception. 4
We will review each section in turn.

48 Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966)).
49 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir.
1981) (involving the commercial activity exception under the FSIA), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1148 (1982).
50 Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
51 Id. at 99.
52
id.
53 TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, (D.C. Cir. 2005).
54 A party could also rely on section 1605(a)(2), the commercial activity exception, but
arguments under that section do not rely on the existence of an arbitral award, as arguments
under sections 1605(a)(1) and 1605(a)(6) do. Therefore, this Article focuses solely on
sections 1605(a)(1) and 1605(a)(6).
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A. Personal Jurisdiction Under the Arbitration Exception
1. PriorCase Law
The text of section 1605(a)(6) of the FSIA is quite lengthy.
relevant portion states:

The

A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States or of the States in any case (6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made
by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise
between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award
made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration
takes place or is intended to take place in the United States, (B) the
agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other
international agreement in force for the United States calling for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards .. .
Only a handful of federal cases discuss the issue of personal
jurisdiction under the arbitration exception, and all of them combine the
arbitration analysis with an implied waiver argument based on section
1605(a)(1).16 So closely are the two arguments linked that it is unclear
whether the courts will allow a party to argue jurisdiction based only on the
arbitration exception. For example, the plaintiff in TMR Energy explicitly
denied its reliance on the implied waiver exception in the trial court,
choosing instead to focus on the arbitration exception. 7 Nevertheless, the
D.C. District Court raised the implied waiver issue sua sponte, eventually
basing its decision on those grounds despite the defendant's claim that a
court ma not consider jurisdictional grounds explicitly eschewed by the
plaintiff.8
" 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6).
56

See TMR Energy Ltd., 411 F.3d 296; S & Davis Int'l Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218

F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000); Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Cargill Int'l S.A. v. MIT Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1993);
Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex Centrala
Navala, 989 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1993); Maritime Ventures Int'l, Inc. v. Caribbean Trading &
Fidelity, Ltd., 732 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); M.B.L. Int'l Contractors v. Trinidad and
Tobago, 725 F. Supp. 52 (D.D.C. 1989) (involving an arbitral award, but argued under the
implied waiver exception rather than the arbitration exception).
57 Brief of Appellant State Property Fund of Ukraine, p. 25 (document on file with the
author and with the D.C. Circuit Court).
58 Id. at 25, 30 (citing World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d
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Of the six other cases involving the arbitration exception, only two
have held that subject-matter jurisdiction existed based on that exception.
Both are questionable on personal jurisdiction grounds. For example, S &
Davis International v. Republic of Yemen 59 involved an arbitral award
against a Yemeni corporation that was held to be an agency or
instrumentality of the state of Yemen. There was some question as to
whether the exception could apply against Yemen itself, since it was not a
signatory to the arbitration agreement, but the Eleventh Circuit held that the
defendant corporation was under the control of the state and that therefore
section 1605(a)(6) applied. 60 The Eleventh Circuit addressed the question
of personal jurisdiction separately from that of subject-matter jurisdiction
but did not discuss its reasons for undertaking a constitutional due process
analysis. Instead, the court sidestepped the issue of whether a foreign state
or agency is a "person" under the U.S. Constitution, preferring to hold that,
in any event, the constitutional elements of personal jurisdiction were met
in these circumstances. 61 Although the Eleventh Circuit's opinion is
evenhanded in many respects, it provides fodder for those who believe that
a state's agreement to arbitrate a dispute opens that state up to enforcement
proceedings in virtually any country 2 by indicating that it is "only 'fair and
just' [for a plaintiff] to seek enforcement of the outcome of a good faith
agreement to arbitrate. 63 The court also held that this sort of enforcement
action "comports with the minimum contacts determination that the
defendant 'should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court' in the
64
forum's jurisdiction."
Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of Qatar also involved the
successful application of the arbitration exception to the issue of subjectmatter jurisdiction, although the primary question here was whether the
arbitration exception could be applied retroactively, which was answered in
the affirmative.
However, the D.C. Circuit separated its discussion of
subject-matter jurisdiction from its discussion of personal jurisdiction,
stating that "although subsection (a)(6) confers subject matter jurisdiction
upon the court, it does not follow that Qatar waived its objection to personal

1154, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1187 (2003)).
59 S&Davis Int'l, 218 F.3d at 1292.
60 Id. at 1302.
61Id. at 1303.
62See, e.g., Halverson, supra note 27, at 179-84.

63 S & Davis Int'l, 218 F.3d at 1304-05 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
64 S & Davis Int'l, 218 F.3d at 1304-05.

65Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
The retroactivity of the FSIA was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
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jurisdiction., 66 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit claimed that "the decisions of
which we are aware have held that an implicit waiver of personal
jurisdiction in a defendant's agreement to litigate or to arbitrate in a
particular jurisdiction is applicable only within that jurisdiction., 67 Thus
"[i]t seems ... implausible that Qatar, by agreeing to arbitrate in France, a
signatory to a treaty containing a similar reciprocal 'recognition and
enforcement' clause, should be deemed thereby to have waived its right to
challenge personal jurisdiction in the United States. 68 This, of course,
takes the opposite view of S & Davis by suggesting that courts that rely on
the arbitration exception must do more than simply establish the existence
of an arbitral award before concluding that personal jurisdiction exists.69
Although the D.C. Circuit was influenced by the fact that Qatar was not a
signatory to the New York Convention, the case provides a useful analysis
of section 1605(a)(b)'s ability to confer personal jurisdiction, as opposed to
its ability to confer subject-matter jurisdiction.
2.

TMR Energy

Given the dearth of case law regarding personal jurisdiction and
enforcement of arbitral awards under the FSIA, TMR Energy takes on
additional importance. TMR Energy followed the holding in Price, namely
that foreign states are not entitled to due process protections under the U.S.
Constitution, and extended that principle to include state agencies and
instrumentalities. If one agrees to the basic principle in Price-thata state
should not be accorded due process under the U.S. Constitution-then the
outcome in TMR Energy is a foregone conclusion. As the D.C. Circuit
stated, "[i]f the State of Ukraine exerted sufficient control over the [State
Property Fund, or SPF] to make it an agent of the State, then there is no
reason to extend to the SPF a constitutional right that is denied to the
sovereign itself."70 As a result, "SPF-like its principal, the State of
Ukraine-is not a 'person' for purposes of the due process clause and
cannot invoke the minimum
contacts test to avoid the personal jurisdiction
71
of the district court.
Upon closer examination, one sees the circularity of the D.C. Circuit's
reasoning. The court decided that, "where the issue is not service of
process under the FSIA but whether an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state is entitled to the protection of the due process clause," then a
different analysis regarding what constitutes an agency or instrumentality of
66
67

68

Id. at 126.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 127.

Id.
TMR Energy, Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
71 Id. at 302.
69
70
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a foreign state is necessary.7 2 However, the court's inquiry will always
result in the agency or instrumentality not receiving any due process
protections.
Basically, the court recognizes that agencies and
instrumentalities are normally presumed to be distinct and independent
from the state unless a sufficient amount of control exists so as to create a
relationship of principal and agent.73 If no such relationship exists, then the
agency or instrumentality will not constitute a "foreign state" and will not
be eligible for any immunity from suit under the FSIA. However, if a
principle-agent relationship does exist, then the agency or instrumentality
can be equated with the state and the U.S. court need not extend any due
process rights to the agency or instrumentality under the U.S. Constitution.
Thus, the analysis will always result in the court embracing jurisdiction
over the state or state agency.
Both TMR Energy and Price relied heavily on the fact that individual
U.S. states are not considered "persons" under the Due Process Clause and
that it therefore "would be highly incongruous to afford greater Fifth
Amendment rights to foreign nations, who are entirely alien to our
constitutional system, than are afforded to the states, who help make up the
very fabric of that system., 74 The D.C. Circuit stated in Price that:
Never has the Supreme Court suggested that foreign nations enjoy rights
derived from the Constitution, or that they can use such rights to shield
themselves from adverse actions taken by the United States. This is not
surprising. Relations between nations in the international community
are seldom governed by the domestic law of one state or the other. And
legal disputes between the United States and foreign governments are
not mediated through the Constitution.75
On its face, this appears to be a valid argument. Upon closer examination,
however, it rings somewhat false. If foreign states are not entitled to some
sort of due process protections, then why did so many courts, including the
D.C. Circuit in Creighton,76 follow the lead of the Second Circuit in Texas
Trading7 7 and undertake separate constitutional analyses concerning the
72

Id. at 301.

73id.

74Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(citing South Carolina v. Kateznbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966)). See also TMR Energy,
Ltd., 411 F.3d at 300.
75Price,294 F.3d at 97 (citations omitted).
76Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 124-25 (D.C.
Cir.
1999) (but noting that because the plaintiff did not make the argument that Qatar was not a
"person" as a matter of constitutional law, the court could not address the issue).
77Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir.
1981) (involving the commercial activity exception under the FSIA), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1148 (1982).
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limits of personal jurisdiction? One answer may be that in undertaking the
"minimum contacts" analyses, the courts were recognizing, however
inelegantly, that principles of international law and comity require some
sort of nexus between the forum and the defendant state,78 and were merely
channeling their inquiries through a familiar constitutional construct.
Certainly the decision in TMR Energy suggests that to be true, with the
court noting that denying constitutional due process protections
is not to say a foreign state is utterly without recourse but only that,
"unlike private entities, foreign nations [being] the juridical equals of
the government that seeks to assert jurisdiction over them," have
available "a panoply of mechanisms in the international arena through
which to seek vindication or redress" if the believe they have been
wrongly haled into court in the United States.
A close reading of the FSIA's statutory declaration of purpose also
indicates that the FSIA was intended to conform with international norms
regarding sovereign immunity and thus "serve the interests of justice" and
"protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants., 8 0 Notably, however,
neither Price nor TMR Energy undertook any such international analysis.
TMR Energy recognized that the defendant raised a defense based on
customary international law, 8' but held that customary international law
cannot "prevail over a contrary federal statute," in this case 28 U.S.C. §
1330(b), which states that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall
exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section
1608 of this title. 8 2 Again, however, that strict statutory reading flies in the
face of the FSIA's statutory declaration of purpose, which references
"international law" 83 -and
acknowledges the desire to "protect the
78 See,

e.g.,

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW

313 (5th ed.

1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 121(2) (1987).
" TMR Energy, 411 F.3d at 300 (quoting Price, 294 F.3d at 98).
8'28 U.S.C. § 1602. But see Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 310 (noting § 1602 contains a
reference to international law "but fails wholly to adopt it").
81 Itis unclear what aspects of customary law were asserted by the defendant,
but the
opinion is silent concerning the propriety, as a matter of comity, of adjudicating the rights of
a foreign state or state agency in a situation like this, where no property of the agency existed
in the United States. The decision is also silent regarding whether and to what extent the
United States has ever permitted its agencies and instrumentalities to be subject to the
jurisdiction of foreign courts where no minimum contacts existed.
82 TMR Energy, 411 F.3d at 303.
83The term "international law" would appear to include customary international
law
concerning sovereign immunity, since the United States is not and never has been a party to
any multilateral treaties on immunity, whereas other countries, such as the United Kingdom,
are. See European Convention on State Immunity (ETS no. 074), entered into force June 11,
1979. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that any alleged waiver of immunity
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84

. . .

of foreign states."

In many respects, the D.C. Circuit would have been far better off
limiting the applicability of Price to its particular facts, as problematic as
they were. Price involved a new exception to sovereign immunity, added
in 1996, which gave the United States jurisdiction over acts involving
torture, hostage taking, and extrajudicial killing.8 5 This is a radical
departure from the bases for the other exceptions to sovereign immunity,
which require either "commercial activity" or waiver.8 6 Instead, section
1605(a)(7) seems to give the United States the right and the power to police
other state's human rights violations, something that has been hotly debated
and contested as a matter of international law.8 7 In light of the
extraordinary nature of section 1605(a)(7), courts should be loath to extend
Price to the other exceptions to sovereign immunity, as the D.C. Circuit has
done in TMR Energy.

Instead, a narrow construction of Price seems much more appropriate.
First, Price itself recognized that "[u]nder the original FSIA... it was
generally understood that in order for immunity to be lost, there had to be
some tangible connection between the conduct of the foreign defendant and
the territory of the United States. 8 8
Price asserted that the 1996
amendment "changed this statutory framework, 8 9 but did not state whether
that change affected all exceptions to sovereign immunity or only those
relating to terrorism. Second, the D.C. District Court recognized in BPA
Int'l, Inc. v. Kingdom of Sweden, a case involving personal jurisdiction
under the FSIA decided just three months after Price, that "before the 1996
amendments to the FSIA. ..

,

FSIA clearly required a nexus between a

plaintiffs claims and the United States, comparable to minimum
contacts." 90 It is notable that the court included the arbitration exception,
created by amendment in 1988, in this statement. The court in BPA Int'l
went on to assert that:
The 1996 amendments relaxed these requirements for claims under a
new exception to the presumption of immunity for foreign nationscontained in other types of international treaties must be very clear to be effective. Frolova
v. Union of Soviet Social Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 376-78 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing the
U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Accords).
84 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
86 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
87 See, e.g., Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique
of the Normative HierarchyTheory, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 741 (2003).

88 Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
89 Id. at 90.
90 BPA Int'l, Inc. v. Kingdom of Sweden, 281 F. Supp. 2d 73, 82 (D.D.C. 2003), appeal

dismissed, No. 03-7183, 2004 WL 1124937, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 2004).
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claims such as torture, hostage taking and extrajudicial killing. Neither
the amendments nor the discussion in Price changed the pre-existing
requirements that there must be some connection between a plaintiffs
claims and the United States for a U.S. court
to assert jurisdiction over a
91
foreign government or its instrumentality.
BPA Int'l thus clearly suggested that Price was to be limited to its facts.
Although BPA Int'l involved the commercial activity exception rather than
the arbitration exception, Creighton-also from the D.C. Circuit-and S &
Davis Int'l from the Eleventh Circuit-both provide additional support for
the proposition that due process analyses are proper and necessary under the
arbitration exception.
As the cases demonstrate, the arbitration exception has not often been
successfully applied in practice. Courts faced with actions to enforce
arbitral awards in the past have often preferred to proceed under section
1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, the implied waiver exception, discussed below.
B. Personal Jurisdiction Under the Implied Waiver Exception
1.

PriorCase Law

According to section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, foreign states "shall not
be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case-(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity
either explicitly or by implication. .,92
Prior to 1988, parties wishing to
enforce an arbitral award against a foreign state had to proceed under an
implied waiver theory, since section 1605(a)(6) had not yet been enacted.93
Typically, in the context of enforcement decisions, U.S. courts have held
that where the defendant state is a contracting state to an enforcement treaty
such as the New York Convention, to which the United States is also a
party, then that state has waived any defense based on lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction (and, in some cases, personal jurisdiction).
The
argument is that the defendant must have contemplated that the courts of
one or more contracting states would become involved in an enforcement
action at the time it signed the convention and the defendant cannot now be

91Id. at 82 (citations omitted).
92

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).

93See, e.g., M.B.L. Int'l Contractors, Inc. v. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F.

Supp. 52 (D.D.C. 1989); Maritime Ventures Int'l, Inc. v. Caribbean Trading & Fidelity, Ltd.,
722 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Maritime Ventures Int'l, Inc. v. Caribbean Trading &
Fidelity, Ltd., 689 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria,
488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated without opinion, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Ipitrade Int'l S.A. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978).
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94
heard to say that it should not be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
However, not every international treaty will give rise to an implied
waiver. For example, in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, the
U.S. Supreme Court considered whether several international agreements
that created no "private rights of action for foreign corporations to recover
compensation from foreign states in United States courts" could provide the
basis for a claim that a state had implicitly waived its immunity under
section 1605(a)(1). 95 As the Supreme Court stated, "we [do not] see how a
foreign state can waive its immunity under [section] 1605(a)(1) by signing
an international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of
immunity to suit in United States courts or even the availability of a cause
of action in the United States., 96 Similarly, in Frolova v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the
Soviet Union had implicitly waived its sovereign immunity because it was a
signatory to the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Accords.97 These
international agreements were deemed to be too vague and general, giving
the court no basis for concluding that "the nations that are parties to these
agreements anticipated when signing them that American courts would be
the means by which the documents' provisions would be enforced. 98
Additionally, courts may find that there is no implied waiver if the
defendant state is not a signatory to an enforcement treaty such as the New
York Convention, even if the award would otherwise be enforceable under
the treaty. For example, in S & Davis Int'l, a Yemeni corporation agreed to
arbitrate a dispute in London under the GAFTA rules. 99 Although the
award was enforceable in the United States as a foreign arbitral award under
the New York Convention, the Eleventh Circuit refused to find that Yemen
had relinquished its sovereign immunity under section 1605(a)(1) because
Yemen was not a signatory to the New York Convention.10 0 Similarly, in
Creighton Ltd., the D.C. Circuit Court held that in agreeing to arbitrate a
case in France, Qatar (a non-signatory to the New York Convention) did not

94 See, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex

Centrala, 989 F.2d 572, 578-79 (2d Cir. 1993); M.B.L. Int'l Contractors,725 F. Supp. at 55
(D.D.C. 1989).
95 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989) (discussing
the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 52; the Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989,
1990-1991, T.S. No. 845; and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 8,
1938, U.S.-Liberia, 54 Stat. 1739, T.S. No. 956).
96 Id. at 442-43.

97 Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 376-78 (7th Cir. 1985).
98 Id. at 378 (quoted in Seetransport Wiking Trader, 989 F.2d at 578).
99 S & Davis Int'l Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1301 (11 th Cir. 2000).
100Id.
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waive its objection to personal jurisdiction in the United States.'°'
Courts are split when it comes to deciding whether merely agreeing to
arbitrate a dispute constitutes an implicit waiver to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. Some courts look at the legislative history of the original FSIA,
which suggests that "with respect to implicit waivers, the courts [in the pre-

FSIA common law] have found such waivers in cases where a foreign state
has agreed to arbitration in another country or where a foreign state has
02
agreed that the law of a particular country should govern a contract."'
Courts that take this approach often decide that the existence of an implicit
waiver under section 1605(a)(1) grants both subject-matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction.'0 3 However, these cases are older and from district,
rather than circuit, courts.
The majority of courts take a restrictive view of implied waivers,
noting that "[flederal courts have been virtually unanimous in holding that

the implied waiver provision of Section 1605(a)(1) must be construed
narrowly."' 4 Indeed, "[i]f the language of the Act is applied literally, the
result is that a foreign sovereign which has waived its immunity can be
subjected to the personal jurisdiction of United States courts regardless of

the nature or quality of its contacts with this country."' 0 5 A broad reading
of the FSIA
would presage a vast increase in the jurisdiction of federal courts in
matters involving sensitive foreign relations: whenever a foreign
sovereign had contracted with a private party anywhere in the world,
and chose to be governed by the laws or answer in the forum of any
country other than its own, it would
expose itself to personal liability in
06
the courts of the United States.

101Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 127 (D.C. Cir.
1999); see also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
102 H.R. REP. No.

1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. at 18 (1976),

reprinted in

1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6617 (as quoted in S & Davis Int'l, 218 F.3d at 1301 (choosing the
narrow approach)).
103 M.B.L. Int'l Contractors, Inc. v. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F. Supp. 52,
56 (D.D.C. 1989); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 482 F.
Supp. 1175, 1177 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated without opinion, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981)..
But see Creighton Ltd., 181 F.3d at 122 (noting the unwelcome effects of following the
suggestions contained in the legislative history).
104Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex
Centrala, 989 F.2d 572, 577 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). See also S & Davis Int'l,
Inc., 218 F.3d at 1301; Cargill Int'l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1017 (2d
Cir. 1993); Maritime Ventures Int'l, Inc. v. Caribbean Trading & Fidelity, Ltd., 722 F. Supp.
1032, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
105 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
106 Id.
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For these reasons, "it is incumbent upon the Court to narrow that
provision's scope."' 7 The exception would be if the parties named the
United States as the arbitral forum. In that case, courts would likely hold
that an implicit waiver exists' 08 since the requisite level of intentionality
would appear to exist. 10 9 Selecting U.S. law to govern the dispute would
also suggest that a foreign state has implicitly waived its objections to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.' 10
As always, it is important to distinguish between an exception's ability
to grant subject-matter jurisdiction and its ability to grant personal
jurisdiction."' Only two cases appear to have concluded that the implicit
waiver of subject-matter jurisdiction also implicitly waives personal
jurisdiction.'12 Numerous other cases concerning enforcement actions have
considered the two issues separately. The best discussion of how an
implicit waiver in an enforcement action affects personal jurisdiction
appears in Creighton. There, the D.C. Circuit held that although the
arbitration exception granted subject-matter jurisdiction, it did not
13
necessarily follow that Qatar waived its objection to personal jurisdiction."
The court's rationale was that the arbitration exception dealt not with
waiver (as did subsection (1)) but with forfeiture of the right to claim
sovereign immunity and thus did not carry the same degree of intentionality
as the waiver provision did. 14 Therefore the court had to ask whether Qatar
had waived its objections to personal jurisdiction in the U.S. courts, and if it
had not, whether the constitutional due process requirements were met." 15
As indicated above, Creighton concluded that a state's agreement to
arbitrate in a jurisdiction other than the United States did not constitute a
waiver of personal jurisdiction in the United States. 1 6 While the court's
opinion was likely influenced by the fact that Qatar was not a signatory to
107 id.
108

Maritime Ventures Int'l, 689 F. Supp. at 1351.

109 Creighton Ltd., 181 F.3d at 122 ("[I]mplicit in [section] 1605(a)(1) is the requirement

that the foreign state have intended to waive its sovereign immunity.")
110 Verlinden B.V., 488 F. Supp. at 1301.
Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v.
I1See, e.g.,
Navimpex Centrala, 989 F.2d 572, 578-79 (2d Cir. 1993); Am. Constr. Mach. & Equip.
Corp. v. Mechanized Constr. of Pakistan, Ltd., No. 85 Civ. 3765, 659 F. Supp. 426, at *1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482
F. Supp. 1175, 1177-79 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated without opinion, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
112 M.B.L. Int'l Contractors, Inc. v. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 725 F. Supp. 52,
56 (D.D.C. 1989); Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm'n, 604 F. Supp. 703, 710 (D.D.C.
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 808 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
113CreightonLtd., 181 F.3d at 126.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116

Id. at 126-27. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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the New York Convention, the analysis underscores the fact that courts
must define the precise nature of a state's actions and identify whether those
actions affect subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction or both. As
Creighton demonstrates, it is possible that an action can establish an
exception to sovereign immunity (i.e., subject-matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA) but still not eliminate a state's ability to object to personal
jurisdiction in the U.S. courts.
2.

TMR Energy

As mentioned above, the lower court in TMR Energy turned what was
a case regarding the arbitration exception into a case regarding the implied
waiver exception.11 7 However, the D.C. Circuit bypassed the implied
waiver argument altogether, relying solely on the defendant's admission
that section 1605(a)(6) of the FSIA applied.11 8 As such, the question of
whether a defendant in an enforcement action proceeding under section
1605(a)(1) may insist on a minimum contacts analysis is technically still
open.
As courts consider the question, they would be well served to consider
the rationale behind the restrictive view of implied waiver.' 1 9 As the
Second Circuit has noted, a majority of courts have construed the implied
waiver exception narrowly. 120 To decide otherwise would give U.S. courts
jurisdiction over virtually any case where a foreign sovereign contracted
with a private party and chose to have the contract governed by the laws or
resolved in the courts of another state. 2 1 As the Second Circuit and New
York federal district courts have recognized, broad jurisdiction over foreign
states and state agencies is antithetical to the perceived international
understanding concerning sovereign immunity as well as the bulk of
existing U.S. case law. Therefore, courts should hesitate before effectively
reversing years of precedent by extending Price and TMR Energy to
implied waiver situations. Although it is likely that future cases in the D.C.
Circuit will follow TMR Energy rather than BPI Int l,122 that is not
117 Brief of Appellant State Property Fund of Ukraine, TMR Energy Ltd.
v. State
Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 03-7191).
l18 TMR Energy, 411 F.3d at 299.
119 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
120 Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex

Centrala, 989 F.2d 572, 577 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). See also S & Davis Int'l Inc.
v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000); Cargill Int'l S.A. v. M/T Pavel
Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1017 (2d Cir. 1993); Maritime Ventures Int'l, Inc. v. Caribbean
Trading & Fidelity, Ltd., 722 F. Supp. 1032, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

121Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
112 BPA Int'l, Inc. v. Kingdom of Sweden, 281 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2003), appeal
dismissed, No. 03-7183, 2004 WL 1124937 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 2004) (involving the
commercial activity exception).
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necessarily true outside of the D.C. Circuit.
IV. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
As can be seen, the law concerning personal jurisdiction over foreign
states or state agencies in enforcement actions is at a crossroads. For
decades, courts have struggled to resolve the tensions between the language
of the FSIA and constitutional notions of due process. On the one hand, the
text and legislative history of the FSIA suggest that there is no need to
establish a jurisdictional nexus between the foreign state and the United
States in cases involving sections 1605(a)(6) and 1605(a)(1), while on the
other hand, numerous decisions have held that parties must comply with
constitutional principles governing personal jurisdiction. Although the
debate seemed nearly settled at one point, the D.C. Circuit has transformed
the issue by shifting the focus away from the FSIA to the U.S. Constitution
itself. Courts in other circuits will doubtless be revisiting their decisions
about the need to consider personal jurisdiction in FSIA actions in the wake
of the D.C. Circuit's recent decisions holding that a foreign state cannot be
considered a "person" for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.
At this point, the only other circuits that have addressed the question of
personal jurisdiction in enforcement actions are the Second and the
Eleventh Circuits. The Second Circuit appears to follow Texas Trading
quite closely and consistently, and will likely not be swayed by the analysis
in Price and TMR Energy. The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand,
demonstrated doubts about the personality of a foreign state in S & Davis
and therefore may follow the D.C. Circuit given the opportunity. No other
circuits appear to have addressed the issue at either the trial or appellate
level, thus leaving parties likely to pursue an enforcement action in those
courts with a great deal of uncertainty.
Although Priceand TMR Energy create problems under U.S. law, they
cause even greater concern under international law. The United States
appears exceedingly anxious to grant itself jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns even though one doubts that the United States would allow
itself, its agencies, or its instrumentalities to be subject to the jurisdiction of
foreign courts under similar circumstances. Given that perspective, the
D.C. Circuit's elimination of minimum contacts as a requirement for
jurisdiction becomes even more questionable. At the end of the day, it
doesn't really matter whether the analysis proceeds under U.S.
constitutional law or international law, as long as it takes place.
Unfortunately, the case law, taken as a whole, suggests that U.S. courts are
more likely to consider such matters if they are embedded within the
framework of domestic law. Indeed, if the opinion in TMR Energy is any
indication, U.S. courts lack the inclination to analyze the question of
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immunity and jurisdiction under international law.
There is also a wider policy point to consider. In a day and age where
the United States is condemned for acting unilaterally, U.S. courts should
be hesitant to accept a wider jurisdiction than previously existed as a matter
of both domestic and international law. Demonstrating a judicious restraint
would signify a respect for international norms that would serve U.S.
interests-and the interests of justice-well.
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